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2Rhema Vaithianathan’s article The Failure of Corporatisation: Public Hospitals in New Zealand
(Agenda 6(4) 1999 325-338) argues that corporatisation of New Zealand’s public hospitals
failed to yield the expected efficiency results due to the failure to recognise that the change in
formal authority from an executive team comprised of medical staff to one comprised of
professional managers belied the unchanged nature of real authority, which remained with
medical staff, and in particular, with doctors.
However, this explanation fails to recognise that the model on which it was based has been
applied successfully for many years in New Zealand’s private nonprofit hospitals.  These
nonprofit hospitals are managed by professional managers, are staffed in most instances by the
same medical personnel as the state-owned hospitals, and are constrained by essentially the
same “political ownership” issues of separation of legal and beneficial ownership, and real and
formal control, as the public system.   Hence, the issue is not one of failure of corporatisation
per se, but a fundamental failure by policy-makers to sufficiently scope and fully understand the
range of stakeholders’ rights impacted by the change.
While the arguments posed by Vaithianathan highlight many of the stakeholder forces
operating within a public hospital environment, the discussion focuses on a set of symptoms
rather than the cause of the failure to successfully implement the corporate model.  This cause
was a significant change in the balance of both real and formal authority at the executive level
away from representatives of the interests of one of the principal stakeholders in the public
hospital system: the patient clients.  The resulting change created a vacuum in representation of
these interests at the executive level which medical staff, as the only remaining patient-agents
left close to a senior executive level, rushed to fill.
The resulting disequilibrium was exacerbated by the concurrent significant weakening of
public owner representation in the decision-making process as political representation was
further distanced via the replacement of elected bodies by appointed boards with no direct
accountability to the public, and the conscious disassociation of politicians from both the
purchasing agendas and ownership responsibilities attendant in the public health system.  The
inevitable result was that the public advocates closest to the ownership of hospital control –
doctors - filled yet another vacuum and assumed an unofficial but incomplete and hence
imperfect political agency for public ‘owners’, strengthening their control position and
consequently their ability to subsequently utilise this control for multiple agendas, including
those furthering personal interests.
Ownership of Nonprofit Organisations
Hansmann’s (1996) theories on the ownership of organisations provide a basis for
understanding the dynamics of the change in New Zealand’s public hospitals as a result of
corporatisation.    Hansmann theorises that, free of constraints, the ownership rights, with
respect to both the right to residual returns and the right to control the firm, will devolve onto
the group of stakeholders under which the total net benefits of the firm and its stakeholders are
maximised1.  These net benefits are dependent on both the costs of market contracting (market
power, risks, information asymmetry, bargaining costs, patron preference costs, etc.) and the
                                                     
1 Hansmann (1996) p 48.  Note that Hansmann refers to stakeholders as “patrons”, and defines them to include
anyone with an exchange relationship with the firm.  This includes suppliers and customers as well as shareholders,
managers and employees.
3costs of ownership (governance, monitoring, costs of poor decisionmaking, costs of risk-
bearing, etc.).
In certain circumstances, the overall most efficient outcomes for all stakeholders can be
obtained where there is no effective formal control by any one set of owners – that is, the
classic nonprofit firm2.   These circumstances generally arise where there is one class of
stakeholder for whom the costs of contracting and ownership are high, resulting in no one class
of individuals to whom ownership can be assigned without creating severe inefficiencies.  The
stakeholders with high costs are typically customers suffering the effects of a severe
information asymmetry leaving them in a poor position to determine, with reasonable cost or
effort, the quality or quantity of services they receive from a firm.  Assigning ownership to
anyone but them creates the opportunity for severe exploitation, but due to their diverse spread
and the relatively small value of the benefits transferred, the costs of including them in the
control processes of ownership are too large.  To overcome the high costs of ownership, the
solution is to create virtual owners where managers of the firm hold it in trust for their
beneficiary customers.  “In essence, the nonprofit firm abandons any benefits of full ownership
in favour of stricter fiduciary constraints on managers.”3  However, the efficiency of this system
relies on the ability of stakeholders to monitor and enforce the performance of these fiduciary
duties.
The evolution of hospital ownership in New Zealand recognises the strong informational
asymmetries present in the health care market.  Medical staff, and doctors in particular, as
identified by Vaithianathan, hold a strong informational advantage over both patients and
hospital owners regarding the form, quality and quantity of care or treatment required.  By
Hansmann’s arguments, in order to overcome this advantage for the overall benefit of all
stakeholders, there is a strong incentive for hospitals to be owned by patients.  The solution to
the practical difficulties of each individual patient having a separate ownership share is to adopt
the nonprofit form.  In New Zealand two distinct nonprofit hospital forms have evolved.   By
far the largest (95 percent of hospital services) is state ownership on behalf of patients, utilising
the processes of political accountability to represent patient and public owner interests.  Of the
remaining 5 percent of hospital services, most are under the control of private nonprofit
enterprises, where a group of trustees manage the hospital within a strictly defined set of
fiduciary duties designed to minimise individual exploitation and preserve the rights of patients.
                                                     
2 “Yet frequently – and especially in large-scale enterprise where the relevant classes of patron are sizeable – the
efficient assignment of ownership is not so obvious.  One reason is that, when the costs of market contracting are
high for a given class of patrons, the cost of ownership are also high too, and for much the same reason: because it is
costly for the patrons in question to become informed about how well the firm is serving them.”  ….
Such patrons are often efficient owners, despite their high costs of ownership.  Even if they cannot monitor the firm’s
management effectively,  and thus cannot exercise much control over the firm beyond that available simply through
market transactions with the firm, it does not follow that there is no substantial gain from having those patrons own
the firm.  To use Albert Hirschman’s felicitous terminology, it can be efficient to assign ownership to a given class of
patrons even if, for those patrons, voice adds little to (the role of) exit in controlling the firm.  An important reason
for this is that, by virtue of their ownership, the patrons are assured that there is no other group of owners to whom
management is responsive.  It is one thing to transact with a firm whose managers are nominally your agents but are
not much subject to your control; it is another to transact with a firm whose managers are actively serving owners
who have an interest clearly adverse to yours.
In short, the costs of contracting for a class of patrons may be substantially reduced by making those patrons owners
even if they will be very passive owners. …
In the extreme , where both the costs of market contracting and the costs of ownership are exceptionally high for a
given class of patrons, the efficient solution is to assign ownership to none of the firm’s patrons but instead to an
unowned, or nonprofit firm.”   Hansmann (1996) p 48.
3 Hansmann (1996) p 228
4Nonprofit trustees are generally accountable to their beneficiaries via publicly published
statements, a public election process, and where a membership status exists, to an additional set
of fiduciaries with public accountability – the members4.
However, in adopting the nonprofit form it is important to recognise that the fiduciary
duties of managers must address both of the principal rights of their owner principals: the right
to the proceeds (or benefits) of the organisation, and the right to control of the organisation.  To
balance the power of a strong stakeholder, in a nonprofit organisation both of these rights must
remain in the control of the beneficiary-owners or their representatives.   However, it is
common to find two separate representative processes operating – one to account for the right
to benefits (beneficial representation) and one to account for the right to control the
organisation (legal representation).   In the publicly-owned hospital, this separation applies with
respect to the rights to benefits of hospital services when a patient enters the hospital for
treatment, and the right of the general public to ensure their interests as technical owners of the
hospital’s assets are preserved in the operation of the business.
Beneficial and Legal Ownership and the New Zealand Hospital Reforms
Prior to the reforms and “corporatisation” of New Zealand’s public hospital system in the late
1980s, there was a transparent attempt to balance these rights at the executive level.  On one
level, the clinical executive management team was directly accountable in its members’
professional capacities to their patient principals for the elements of care relating to patient
benefits, while simultaneously on another level it was accountable to the public owners in the
capacity as agent of the legal owners, the elected Area Health Boards.   By placing both agency
relationships directly in the same management team, the public hospital management process
replicated the dual agency present in the trustee managers of private nonprofit hospitals, who
held responsibility for both clinical care of patient beneficiaries and the effective operation and
maintenance of the hospital assets legally held in trust by the organisation.
While it is acknowledged that the public hospital beneficial and legal owner accountability
processes were far from perfect, being subject to the effects of political leverage and the
significant operational inefficiencies present in the middle and lower levels of the public
hospital management hierarchy, this ‘mutual agency relationship’5 ensured that the public
ownership issues, both beneficial and legal, were addressed simultaneously at the same table.
These managers were subject to the dual disciplines of their professional accountability to
patients and their employee accountabilities to political principals, requiring each decision to be
made with both stakeholdings in mind.  That is, they executed the two distinct fiduciary duties
to the public owner simultaneously via two separate accountability mechanisms.
When professional managers were inserted at the executive level, any direct representative
input from and direct fiduciary duty to patient beneficiaries in executive decision-making was
lost.  The principal accountability of these managers was solely to the legal ownership
represented by the public owner in the form of the shareholding minister and his appointed
board.  All performance measures were solely aligned to discharging this ownership duty
                                                     
4 The legally defined members of a nonprofit organisation play an important role in both disciplining the board of
trustees, and providing an additional avenue of representation for non-member beneficiaries in the decision-making
process (e.g. Mason (1984), Howell (1999)).
5 This term is used to reflect the ability of a dual agency in one body to work synergistically for the benefits of both
agency relationships by reducing both the conflict and coordination costs of ownership identified by Hansmann.
5(financial returns on assets) with patient-beneficiary advocacy relegated to second-tier clinical
staff.  As expected, the measurable and the incentivised activities were performed at the
expense of the hard to measure and unrewarded6.  Simultaneously, any capacity for either
patient-beneficiaries or individual public owners to voice their ownership rights or call their
fiduciaries to account in any individual hospital via a direct political process was eliminated
when the locally-elected Area Health Boards were replaced by ministerially-appointed boards,
whose fiduciary responsibilities were also clearly limited to the issues of legal ownership.
Direct accountability to beneficiary ownership was thus restricted to the national parliamentary
political process, which itself was intent on separating its accountabilities for purchasing
(patient benefits) from providing (legal ownership).  Each successive level of division further
restricted the ability to balance both of the public ownership rights at the same table, and
further disenfranchised the beneficial owner.
The end result had three significant impacts.  The first was the local optimisation of each
of the ownership processes, without consideration of the impacts of one on the other.  The
second was a significant increase in the cost of ownership in the health system, predictable
from Hansmann’s theories and evidenced by Ashton (1998), as the coordination of all the
diverse interests which were previously combined in the single management structure had to be
procured at financial expense, both in terms of explicit purchase of coordination, and the
hidden costs of inefficient decisions made as a result of local optimisation in the interests of
only one of the stakeholder ownership interests rather than balancing of both.  This is illustrated
by Vaithianathan’s examples of holdup by doctors in the contract negotiation process, where
optimisation of ownership interests represented by management clashed with optimisation of
beneficial ownership interests represented by doctors, with the consequence that the combined
beneficial and legal owner lost out on both counts, and had no ability to call the fiduciaries to
account outside of a very remote generic political response via parliamentary representation and
a triennial election process.
The third impact, the symptom recognised by Vaithianathan, was the move by doctors to
fill the void of patient-beneficiary representation at hospital management level.  While
clinicians had been removed from key decision-making processes in executive management, as
patient-advocates they were left closest to the hospital executive decision-making process of
any of the patient-agents as a result of the restructuring.  As restoration of the natural
equilibrium required the patient beneficiary representation void to be filled, the patient-agents
best equipped to fulfil this role – doctors - sought to gain some control of the executive process.
However, without formal control, the only way that the equilibrium could be restored was by
strengthening their effective control.  Legitimate beneficial agency representation on behalf of
their own patients was possible, but this limited stakeholder power base was too small to
counter the strength of the legitimate ownership control exercised by management.  Thus, by
seeking, and gaining, wider public support for their representative activities, they assumed an
informal proxy representation status for the otherwise disenfranchised wider public ownership.
The result, as Vaithianathan shows, was the increased political advocacy roles of umbrella
groups such as the Medical Council and the Specialist Association.  The effective power of
these groups was increased by public support.  However, as the representation was informal, it
lacked the discipline of a specific accountability process with respect to the public’s legal
ownership stake.  Consequently, there was little ability for the public to constrain the umbrella
groups’ use of their newly reinforced power to advance their own personal agendas as well as
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6those of their public quasi-principals.  While Vaithianathan’s findings indicate that the real but
unrecognised power of doctors was overlooked in the application of the corporate model, my
analysis shows that this application of the corporate model actually created an opportunity for
doctors to add an informal string to their agency bow which actually increased their effective
power as it was unchecked by any formal accountability process.  Opportunistic exploitation of
this unbridled power was inevitable, with consequent efficiency losses which exceeded those
incurred in the former imperfect, but more equitable, representative process.
This outcome, however, begs the question of how the private nonprofit hospital sector
utilises this corporate structure without the same efficiency losses, given that in most instances,
professional managers rather than medical personnel have traditionally filled the executive
roles, and the same clinical staff employed in the public sector also work in the private
hospitals.  The key to this lies in a full stakeholder analysis.  Generally, private nonprofit
hospitals have two additional stakeholder classes which are absent in the public model – paying
customers and donors.  These two stakeholder classes exert an additional discipline on the
management which is clearly lacking in the public model.  Even though they make a part-
payment, nonprofit hospital customers are nonetheless beneficiaries, as they receive a fee
reduction as a result of cross-subsidisation from other fundraising.  However, if the managers
make a decision which breaches their beneficiary rights, such as the excessive personal
opportunism evidenced above which increases the part payment required, the beneficiary group
can discipline that management by voluntarily withdrawing their custom and patronising
another nonprofit hospital7.  Similarly, if donors perceive that their donations are not being
applied in the manner intended, they will also withdraw their support.  In either case, the
private nonprofit hospital runs the risk of failure.  These disciplines bind the behaviour of not
only the managers, but also the trustees in the execution of their legal owner duties, to further
the interests of beneficiaries.
The application of the public “corporatisation” model, as well as overlooking the interests
of beneficiary owners, also overlooked the role of direct customer discipline of both hospital
management and the management of purchasing authorities, by combining the purchaser and
donor role into a single authority with no direct accountability to the beneficiary recipient
outside of the political process.   While the purchasing body could discipline hospital
management by applying patronage constraints, beneficiaries could not discipline the
purchasing agency management in any direct manner for hospital purchasing activities which
impacted on their beneficial status.   Again, this opened the market for patient representation to
the professional umbrella groups.  As they were already engaged in advocacy with hospital
management, there were economies of scope available to these groups to extend that advocacy
role to matters of beneficiary disenfranchisement at the purchasing level as well.  Thus, public
hospital management became hostage to holdup not only as a result of its own internal
activities, but also as a result of the activities of the purchasing body.  Vaithianathan’s example
of staff at one hospital refusing to carry out operations purchased on behalf of a second hospital
is evidence of this.  Again, while the patient-beneficiary may have gained some representation,
the owner-beneficiary paid the cost, both of the advocacy and the efficiency losses due to any
concurrent opportunistic advancement of agents’ personal agendas.
                                                     
7 It is noted that medical insurance companies as customer-agents can also exert a purchasing discipline on nonprofit
hospital managers and trustees, notwithstanding any beneficiary status.
7Implications for Future Policy-Making
The failure of this particular corporatisation attempt should not, however, be interpreted as
either a structural failure of the model applied, or as advocacy for replicating the ways of the
past.   The private nonprofit application of this structure shows that, with balanced stakeholding
representation and accountability in the management and governance levels, there is a role for
the corporate model in achieving greater operational efficiencies in a nonprofit, and hence state-
owned, hospital environment.  The Area Health Board structure, while offering some level of
direct public input in hospital management processes, provided far from ideal representation
due to biases and opportunism related to its own political accountabilities, agendas and
purchasing power, and hence appears to offer little in the way of new approaches to the
representation dilemma, especially given the reforms which have subsequently occurred in the
rest of the health sector.
The real challenge for policy-makers is to examine the stakeholding dynamics of public
hospitals and determine alternative ways of not just reintroducing direct public owner
accountability, but also of introducing additional monitoring and disciplining mechanisms
which measure and enforce the performance of the managers’ fiduciary duties to all of their
stakeholding principals.   Furthermore, this must be done within the context of the wider
publicly-funded health system, to ensure that reforms in the hospital sector do not create
unexpected flow-on effects elsewhere.
The salutary lesson for policy-makers from the hospitals’ experiment with
‘corporatisation’ of a state operation is that any changes that don’t take into account the full
stakeholding profiles of the organisation will fail.  As state-owned organisations are nonprofit
organisations, there must be a careful analysis in particular of the separate and distinct rights of
the public as both beneficial owners and as ultimate legal owners of the organisation and its
activities, and the rights and responsibilities of the public as customers.  For in the final
analysis, the primary stakeholders in any organisation are its owners and its customers –
managers and employees are merely brokers who facilitate an exchange of value which, if well-
designed, will enhance the position of both of these primary stakeholders.  Hence, any change
must look at the needs of owners and customers first.  It was failure to give due priority to, in
particular, the needs of the beneficial owner which precipitated the failure of the hospital
reforms.  The behaviour of doctors was a direct consequence of this, but not, as Vaithianathan
argues, the cause of the failure.
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